CHAPTER III. CICERO AS AN ADVOCATE. ATTICUS. CICERO'S FAMILY. 71-67 B.C. OMPEY and Crassus were not good friends, but a common interest now drew them together. Pompey claimed a triumph for his victories in Spain. The claim was irregular. Pompey had never been consul or praetor. He had therefore no legitimate "auspices" to hallows his success, and so was not properly qualified for the religious ceremonial of the triumph. In former days the great Scipio himself had asked in vain for a triumph under similar circumstances. But Pompey had already a precedent in his own case, and it was short-sighted pedantry on the part of the Senate to refuse what even Sulla had been obliged to concede. Pompey likewise demanded that the privilege should be granted him of overstepping all the minor magistracies and being at once accepted as a candidate for the consulship. To the restrictions of age prescribed by the law he might well reply, as Napoleon did on a like occasion, "a man grows old on the field of battle, and that is where I have been." Here again the government, which might easily have won the support of Pompey, foolishly haggled over the price. The Nobles had soon reason to regret their obstinacy. The democrats grasped the opportunity 71 B.C.and called on Pompey to put himself at the head of the opposition. Pompey and Crassus availed themselves of the pretext of their intended triumph to march their united armies to the gates of Rome. The Senate, which had no troops available, was forced to an ignominious surrender; the necessary decrees were passed, and Pompey and Crassus were elected consuls for the year 70 on the understanding that they were to satisfy the two great sections of the opposition, the democrats by the restoration of their former legal right of initiative to the tribunes, and the Knights by placing them once more on the judicial bench. In this great assault on the constitution of Sulla, Cicero naturally went with the equestrian order and took the side of Pompey and the opposition. He frankly accepted Pompey for his political leader, and the bond thus knit between them, though often subjected to severe strain, was never wholly broken. Whether Cicero heartily approved of the restoration of the tribunate, or whether he merely acquiesced in it as part of the bargain between the factions, is certain. His references to the change at the time, are slight, but they seem to imply satisfaction. Even in later years, when he had himself suffered from the unbridled power of a tribune, he contended, though somewhat faintly, that Pompey was justified in his policy. He urges that, though the power of the tribune is doubtless excessive, yet "the violence of the people is a force yet more savage by far and more uncontrollable, and this is sometimes under greater restraint, if it has a leader, than if it has none; for the leader considers that he advances at his own peril, whereas the popular impulse takes no account of danger." "Pompey," he continues, "was bound to have regard not only to what was most desirable, but to what was necessary. It was the part of a wise citizen not to leave to some pestilent demagogue the credit of a measure, which was not so very dangerous in itself, and which was too popular to be resisted." But if Cicero were dubious or neutral in respect of this portion of the programme of the opposition, it was far otherwise when he dealt with the reform of the jury-courts.